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Sum ma ry
The concept of Net Present Value (NPV) is a widely accepted tool for verification of
financial rationality of planned investment projects. Projects with positive NPV increase
a company’s value. Similarly, those with negative NPV lead to a decline in the value of
a business. This article attempts to answer the question: are projects with negative NPV
always disadvantageous in terms of maximization of shareholder value and when should
an NPV-negative project be considered justified?
The authors discuss the issues of project valuation depending on different conditions.
First, they briefly summarize the main idea of valuation – the aim of every company is to
maximize shareholder value. Contemporary professional texts say that the way to achieve
this goal is through projects that can generate a positive Net Present Value. When there
are no such investments within reach, the company should pay dividends to its owners.
The authors claim that some circumstances justify investments with a negative Net Present
Value, as they still produce maximum possible shareholder value. The three model
situations where this takes place are: (1) tax on dividends; (2) shareholders’ perception
of risk; and (3) temporary inefficiency of the markets.
Taxes on dividends reduce cashflows for shareholders from distributed dividends.
Therefore, they act exactly as an investment with a negative NPV. The authors conclude
that this creates an opportunity to maximize shareholder value by comparing this loss
with available alternate projects with negative NPV. If the loss of worth, caused by such
taxes, is bigger that the negative NPV of possible investments it will be more rational to
Nr 3/2010(15) WSPÓŁCZESNA EKONOMIA
119
* Dr,  ad iunkt, Aka de mia  Le ona  Koź miń skie go  w War sza wie.
** Mgr, DCF Con  sul  ting Sp. z o.o. invest instead of paying dividends. And, according to the authors, a project with a negative
NPV leads to maximized shareholder value.
In the second situation, the authors point out that some projects may have negative
fundamental (intrinsic) value when valuated by the market (diversified owners) because
of their higher expected rate of return. In the same circumstances, an undiversified
shareholder may have a different perception of the investment. It is highly possible that
he would be ready to accept a lower rate of return in exchange for more safety for his
capital. The authors conclude that negative fundamental value (based on the market
situation) may be of importance for such shareholder as he prefers projects with lower risk
and a lower rate of return.
Temporary inefficiencies of the markets may produce a risk of bankruptcy or liquidity
problems. The authors argue that NPV-negative projects may be a way to free additional
cashflows, which will allow the financial restructuring of the company. 
Introduction
The generally accepted theory of corporate finance posits that an investment project
will translate into higher shareholder value (SV) if it generates a positive Net Present
Value (NPV). From the perspective of a company’s owners, projects with a negative NPV
are economically irrational, as they lead to a decline in their wealth. However, the authors
of this text believe that there are some exceptions to that rule. The next sections present
three cases where opting for an NPV-negative project is an optimum choice to maximize
shareholder value.
1. Acceptance of NPV-Negative Projects and Tax on Dividends
The theory of residual dividend, formulated for the first time by G. Preinreich
(Preinreich, 1932: 273–289), indicates that a company should distribute its free funds
(cash surplus) to its owners (as dividends or other distributions to shareholders, e.g.
repurchase of shares or cost-based transfers that are actually cash distributions to owners
(Mielcarz, 2009: 97–119)) after financing all available projects with a positive NPV
(Baker, Smith, 2006: 1–2). In accordance with this concept, free cash flow that is left in
a company and are not allocated to projects that offer a return above a level required by
capital providers will lead to the ineffective utilization of capital, which should translate
into a decline in the price of shares of such company1. And if the course of action is taken
in line with the residual dividends theory, the price of shares will drop by the amount paid
to the investors, but from the perspective of the shareholder value this decline will be
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1 A situation where the rate of return expected by an investor exceeds the rate of return earned by
the company on its investment projects leads to a negative NPV and, thus, to a decline in the price of its
shares. One may ask here about the perception of risk for various investors and, consequently, the
mechanisms they use to estimate expected returns. This issue, and its impact on the estimations of NPV
of various projects, is discussed in detail in the second part of this article. compensated by an increase in cash in their private accounts. Therefore, if dividends are
not taxed, transfers of cash to owners are neutral for their wealth2.
Some authors point out that the fact that a company has some free funds that will not
be allocated immediately to any specific project will not necessarily lead to an automatic
decline in the shareholder value, provided that the company decides to use an option to
defer a project in time until the optimum moment comes for the implementation of an
NPV-positive project e.g. takeo-ver of another company (Trigeorgis, 1995: 5). However,
it may also be assumed that in such situations decision-makers take into account the
expected NPV of the project (weighted with the probability of the actual implementation
of the project), i.e. their behavior is in accordance with the residual dividend theory. 
The analysis of the assumptions of the residual dividend theory and of the concept of
maximization of shareholder value bears a question about the universality of the thesis
which posits that the only rational way, from the perspective of financial interests of
a company’s owners, is either to implement projects that offer a positive NPV or to
distribute any free cash to them in absence of such projects. The example below shows
that if tax on dividends is included in such analysis, the statement formulated as above
must be verified. 
Example 1
The market capitalization of a company (E) is 1000 currency units (c.u.) at a moment
of time assumed as point zero. The company has 100 c.u. in free funds, which it may use
to finance some investment projects. On the basis of currently available information,
investors expect that those funds will be allocated to an investment project with NPV =
0. After an in-depth analysis, the company’s board concludes that the project may generate
actual positive free cash flows having their present value (PV) at the level of 81 c.u.,
while necessary expenditures (PVI) amount to 100 c.u. In the country where the company
operates capital gains are subject to a 19% tax rate, if it is paid as withholding tax on
dividends, while in the case of an increase in the price of shares such tax is paid after
shares are sold, and only if the investor realizes a gain. The available information is
summarized in Table 1. 
What steps should be taken in that situation to maximize shareholder value? In
accordance with the residual dividend theory, the project should be dropped, as having
a negative NPV, and dividends should be paid to the shareholders, since that concept says
that if there are no NPV-positive projects, the maximization of shareholder value is
tantamount to the reduction of its decline. However in order to verify whether such
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2 Contrary to the fundamental approach, some empirical researches confirm the hypothesis of the
signaling effect of dividend announcements (Michaeley, Thaler, Whomack, 1995: 573–608). They
indicate that share prices respond positively to information on higher than expected or previously
unexpected distributions of dividends. This is because the market is adjusting the share valuation level
to new information, which was previously available only to managers, as management’s recommendation
to pay higher than expected dividends is a signal for investors that the financial situation of the company
is better than previously assumed. Therefore, the researches that confirm the signaling effect hypothesis
as viable also challenge the classic theorem that dividends do not affect shareholder value. scenario is rational, it is worth calculating final shareholder value in both scenarios, i.e.
the distribution of dividends and the execution of the NPV-negative project. In the
‘with-dividends’ variant, shareholder value should be calculated as follows3:
SVD = E – D + C∆ [Formula 1]
where: SVD – total shareholder value in the ‘with-dividends’ scenario; D – dividends paid
by the company; C∆ – increase in balances in the accounts of shareholders due to the
distribution of dividends, which is calculated with the following formula:
C∆ = D × (1 – tD) [Formula 2]
where: td – rate of tax on dividends.
SVD = 1000 c.u. – 100 c.u. + 100 c.u.× (1–0,19)
SVD = 981 c.u.
In the scenario assuming the implementation of the NPV-negative project, shareholder
value will be calculated with the following formula:
SVP = E + NPV [Formula 3]
where: SVP – shareholder value in the ‘with-project’ scenario; NPV – net present value of
the examined project.
SVP = 100 c.u. + (–19) c.u.
SVP = 981 c.u.
In this example, the implementation of the project with its NPV higher than –19 c.u.
will give shareholder value higher than the distribution of dividends. This example shows
that when tax on dividends reduces shareholder value more than a project that generates
a negative NPV, the company should opt for the NPV-negative project. It means that –
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3 Assuming that only fundamental factors affect shareholder value and that dividends create no
positive signaling effect. 
Table 1. Example 1 – initial data
Source: own study.
Value of shares before decision, including free cash that may be used either for
investments or for dividends E0 1000
Free cash for investments or distributions to shareholders PVI 100
Present value of available investment projects PV 81
Net present value of available investment projects NPV –19from the perspective of shareholder value – an NPV-negative project may be better
justified than the distribution of free funds as dividends. Such solution is optimal in
a situation where tax paid on dividends should exceed the decline in the price of shares
resulting from the execution of an NPV-negative project. 
This relationship may be presented as the following general equation:
If: tD => SVmax = E + NPV
– [Formula 4]
where: SVmax – maximum shareholder value at a given moment.
It should be noted that the decision to execute an NPV-negative project, as described
above, is also optimal if capital gains are taxed. Such tax liability may only occur when
the price of shares goes up. If we omit behavioral finance arguments and assume the
market is fully efficient, the price of shares may only grow as a result of NPV-positive
ventures. So, if the company from the example implements projects that generate NPV in
the range from –19 to 0, its shares will not rise, and, no tax on capital gains will be due.
In turn, if NPV for a project is positive, the increase in the value of shares will be reduced
by capital gains tax, which, however, will only be payable on the surplus, i.e. NPV for the
project. Consequently, a decision to execute a project will always maximize shareholder
value for NPV equal to or higher than –19 c.u. 
The above example may be the base for a more general residual dividend theory. If
tax on dividends is taken into account, the theory should be formulated as follows: in
a situation of limited availability of NPV-positive projects, a company that applies the
concept of maximization of shareholder value should implement all projects with
a positive NPV and those NPV-negative projects that lead to a lower decline in the price
of its shares than the loss of shareholder value resulting from the need to pay tax on
dividends.
2. Risk Perception, Fair Value and Net Present Value
The fact whether a given project creates positive shareholder value or not depends,
to a large extent, on the rate of return expected by shareholders. It seems that the expected
return parameter is subjective and, hence, a project may have different NPVs for investors
who formulate different assessments of project-related risks. However, the theory of
finance provides some clues how to determine a minimum expected return from the
perspective of a company’s shareholders that would be justified in the context of assumed
risk. The determination of such rate should lead to the estimation of the “objective”, or
fair, value of a project. To determine its level, the assumptions of the Fair Value Theory,
the Portfolio Theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model should be analyzed in more
detail. If the level of the “objective” expected rate of return is determined, this will allow
for presenting arguments in favor of the thesis that the execution of projects that generate
a lower rate of return may be a rational choice from the perspective of the financial
interests of shareholders.
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concept is considered one of the most important at present (Pratt, Niculita, 2008: 41–47).
IAS 39, 40 and 41 and IFRS 3 provide that the market price, quoted in an active market,
is the most accurate reflection of the fair value of a given asset. In accordance with the
above standards, if there is no active market for a given asset, the assessment of its fair
value should refer to a situation as if a hypothetical transaction in an active market were
completed. In addition, IAS 38.7 points to liquidity as one of the key attributes of an
active market, which in practice is tantamount to the assumption of an unlimited number
of investors who are potentially interested in the purchase or sale of a given asset. 
The assumption of an unlimited number of buyers and sellers is fundamental for
determination of the expected rate of return (discount rate) that could be used for valuation
of assets unlisted in an active market in accordance with the fair value standard. The
above assumption leads to the conclusion than the “objective” rate of return should be
insensitive to the liquidity level of a given asset, as a fully active market creates no
liquidity problems. However, since the presence in such market of investors who diversify
their risk in accordance with the assumptions of the portfolio theory of H. Markowitz
(Markowitz, 1952: 77–91) cannot be ruled out, the rate that would allow for determination
of fair value of a given asset (including an investment project) should neither include
a premium for specific risk (Sharpe, 1964: 425–442). If specific risk is eliminated, the rate
of return on investments in a given asset that is expected by the owners would lower to
a level reflecting their systematic risk, a premium for investing in equity instruments and
a risk-free rate4. The assumptions of existence of an active market and of a possibility to
reduce specific risk by diversification of an investment portfolio, and, consequently, the
justification of a premium on capital at the level of systematic risk related to a given asset
only are fully in accordance with the assumptions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM). Therefore, there are arguments in favor of the conclusion that the CAPM is
a suitable tool for determination of the objective rate of return expected by shareholders,
which allows for estimations of fair value of not only equity instruments, but also
investment projects in an inactive market. If the managers of a company accepted a project
with a rate of return below the level resulting from the CAPM, the capitalization of such
company in an active and fully-informed market would immediately slump by the
negative NPV of such project. That’s why a company that has a diversified shareholder
base and operates in accordance with the shareholder value maximization concept should
reject projects that create a rate of return lower than the return estimated with the use of
the CAPM. Figure 1 summarizes the above line of reasoning.
A decision on whether or not to execute a project and on its impact on shareholder
value becomes more complicated when shareholders do not apply the concept of
diversification to their investment portfolios. This is the case, for example, when an
investor holds 100% of shares in a given company and has no other significant assets,
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4 It should be noted here that in the real life in a perfectly active market investors who reduce the
specific risk of an investment by diversification accept the lowest expected rates of return, and, thus, the
highest transaction prices. So, it is this group of investors that imposes the terms of buying on the other
participants of an active market. except those shares. In such a situation, the company is the investment platform of its
owner, used not only for value management, but also to diversify the private investment
portfolio. For the owner’s wealth and risk level, it could be rational to adopt a strategy
under which the company accepts projects that do not generate the “objective” fair rate
of return, but, despite this, still reduce the level of the owner’s private risk. Such situation
is presented in Example 2.
Example 2
ABC Company is examining a streamlining project that is to reduce operating
expenses as a result of purchase of more advanced machinery for manufacturing
operations. The project should generate the following fee cashflow for equity (FCFE):
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structure is diversified. For the current owners, ABC shares are only marginal parts of
their investment portfolios. The shareholders make their investment decisions in line with
the portfolio theory standards. In addition, there is no problem to sell shares at no cost.
The rate of return excepted by capital providers, estimated with the CAPM, is 11%. Will
this project increase shareholder value?
In the above circumstances, the current shareholders will expect the minimum rate of
return at the level of 11%. This value represents the expected rate of return on investments
in the company’s shares in accordance with the assumptions of fair value estimates. To
follow the concept of maximized shareholder value, the company should not start any
project with a lower rate of return. 
For the expected return of 11%, the project create a negative NPV of (–) 0.46 million
c.u., so its execution would lead to a decline in the capitalization of the company and, as
a result, of shareholder value. The calculations are presented below:
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Table 2. Example 2 – initial data
Source: own calculations.
Year 0 1 2 3
FCFE –10,0 5,0 3,5 3,0
Source: own calculations.
Table 3. Example 2 – Project assessment from the perspective of the diversified shareholders
Year 0 1 2 3
FCFE –10,0 5,0 3,5 3,0
DFCFE –10,0 4,6 3,0 2,4
NPV –0,5
The calculations show that if the company wants to protect the interests of the
diversified shareholders it should abandon the project. However, one should ask here
about the assessment of the project if the conditions of estimates of fair value were not
met, i.e. assuming the non-existence of conditions under which the investors perceive
risk in accordance with the CAPM. 
Example 2 continued 
Let’s assume that one investor holds 100% of shares in ABC Company and that all
his assets are invested in that company, which means that the owner’s investment portfolio
is not diversified. Such investor has high risk aversion and prefers safe investments, which
will protect the value of his assets and reduce the risk connected with the company’s
operations. From his perspective, the above investment meets such condition. Reduced
risk appetite lowers the owner’s expected rate of return on the market-risk-freestreamlining investment below the level of the “objective” rate, calculated from the
perspective of diversified minority investors. For the undiversified investor it equals 7%.
On that basis, the NPV of the project may be estimated for the owners holding all the
shares of the company:
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Source: own calculations.
Table 4. Example 2 – Project assessment from the perspective of the undiversified shareholder
Year 0 1 2 3
FCFE –10,0 5,0 3,5 3,0
DFCFE –10,0 4,7 3,1 2,4
NPV 0,2
The above shows that a change of risk perception, and, thus, the expected rate of
return, leads to a situation where a project can generate positive shareholder value despite
negative fair value. From the perspective of a single investor (if his asset portfolio is not
diversified) it is possible that he will not always determine expected rates of return in
accordance with the fair value concept. 
Asimilar divergence between NPVs of a project for diversified investors and for an
undiversified investor may occur for higher-risk ventures. In such a case, diversified
investors would estimate their expected rates of return on the basis of assessments how
a given project increases only the systematic risk of investing in given shares. And the
undiversified investor would be sensitive to all risks, so he would add a premium for
specific risk to the expected rate of return on a project. Differences between expected
rates of return may lead to different calculations of NPVs – even if a project may create
a positive NPV for diversified investors, who estimate its fair value, the same project
could be financially unreasonable for an investor who is sensitive to its specific risk.
To recapitulate the above discussion, it should be concluded that it is possible that an
undiversified investor will opt for the execution of a project despite its negative fair value
or for the rejection of a project with positive fair value.
3. Acceptance of NPV-Negative Projects and Protection of Financial
Liquidity
The acceptance of NPV-negative projects may also maximize shareholder value
where an alternate scenario leads to the loss of financial liquidity or forces the liquidation
of a company. It is possible during periods of temporary inefficiency of financial markets
and of tangible asset markets. By choosing an NPV-negative project, shareholders buy
time and funds that are necessary to initiate corrective actions to avoid a further
deterioration of the company’s financial standing. The next example presents such
a situation:Example 3
ABC Company (real estate developer) bought an undeveloped property for 10 million
c.u. two years ago. Its current value in the market is 2 million c.u. However, the market
does not comply with the active market definition as a result of the recent panic escape
of investors from the investment real property segment, coupled with a surplus on the
supply side in the land market caused by a deteriorating financial situation of many
developers. Many experts believe the capital outflow is only temporary and real estate
prices should recover to the previous level in the next few years. In such circumstances
the fair value of the plot was assessed at 9 million c.u. ABC Company has now some
financial problems. Analyses show that if it built and sold apartments on the subject plot,
the NPV of the project would be negative – at a level of 3 million c.u., assuming that the
initial expenditures would include the real property valued at 9 million c.u. as contribution
in kind. In addition to the higher fair value of that real property, the negative NPV is also
an effect of lower apartment prices accepted by end buyers. The detailed calculations for
the project are included in Table 5:
WSPÓŁCZESNA EKONOMIA Nr 3/2010(15)
128
Because of the difficult situation of the ABC company, its management takes into
account not only the maximization of value, but also changes in cash balance as a result
of the project. If the company fails to ensure new inflows of cash, it may lose its ability
to serve and repay loans taken in the past for real estate purchases. From such perspective,
the project looks attractive: ABC would increase its cash by 2,2 million c.u. in Year 1 and
by 2,7 million c.u. in Year 2 and 3. As a result, it would recover part of the capital frozen
in the financing of the property to be contributed in kind into the project. As already
mentioned, an alternative scenario to improve liquidity could be the sale of the plot for 2
million c.u., but it would not be optimal both in terms of value (NPV = –7 million c.u.)
and in terms of liquidity protection (a considerably lower inflow of cash). 
In this example, the execution of the NPV-negative project is optimal for shareholder
value. Akeep-waiting scenario, i.e. postponing the project until the fair value of the plot
reaches the level of its market price (which would also mean an increase in apartment
prices) will most likely lead to the continued deterioration of the company’s financial
Source: own calculations.
Table 5. Example 3 – Calculations of NPV for the housing development project of ABC Company
Year 0 1 2 3
FCFE (investement expenditure excluded) 4.2 2.7 2.7
Project expenditures to be covered from the company’s own resources –2.0
Fair value of the plot (contribution in kind) –9.0
FCFE for NPV calculations –9.0 2.2 2.7 2.7
Expected fair value rate of return 12%
Discounted FCF –9 2.0 2.1 1.9
NPV –3.0situation, and even its bankruptcy, which would inevitable slash down shareholder value.
The company has no other options to get capital, except for releasing cash frozen in
illiquid assets. Therefore, one may conclude that when a company needs capital while its
financial situation is deteriorating the financial restructuring by execution of
NPV-negative projects could maximize shareholder value.
Conclusions
This article was intended to present some situations when an NPV-negative project
could be the right choice to maximize shareholder value. There is a consensus that if
a company lacks projects that would generate positive NPV, it should allocate its free
cash to dividends. However, the situation turns out to be more complex if dividends are
taxed. For shareholders, it is the same as if the project’s NPV was negative. In such case,
a project with an insignificant negative NPV can be used to maximize shareholder value.
If the company can execute a project whose absolute NPV is greater than tax on dividends,
its implementation would maximize shareholder value.
The same investment project may have different NPVs for various investors. The
main reason is different expected rates of return of shareholders who diversify their risk
by investing in many different financial instruments and shareholders who are sensitive
to total risk. Differences in risk perception may lead to situations where low-risk and
low-return projects are rejected by diversified investors, but accepted by shareholders
who are searching for options to diversify their private assets through low-risk projects.
The same reason also explains different behaviors when a high-return and high-risk
project is welcomed by diversified investors, but unacceptable for undiversified ones.
The third situation described here is connected with the need to execute an
NPV-negative project to rescue the company. In this case, an NPV-negative project usually
is to release new cashflows to eliminate temporary liquidity shocks and, as a result, to
create the environment in which the business will keep going on and can be restructured. 
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oujem nym NPV
Stresz cze nie
Kon cep cja  war to ści  ak tu al nej  net to  (NPV)  jest  po wszech nie  przy ję tym  spo so bem
okre śla nia  ra cjo nal no ści  pla no wa nych  przed się wzięć  in we sty cyj nych.  Pro jek ty  o do dat -
niej  NPV  ge ne ru ją  wzrost  war to ści  fir my.  Ana lo gicz nie,  pro jek ty  o ujem nym  NPV  po wo -
du ją  spa dek  war to ści  przed się bior stwa.  W ar ty ku le  pod ję to  pró bę  od po wie dzi  na  py ta nie,
czy  pod ję cie  dzia łań  o ujem nym  NPV  jest  za wsze  nie ko rzyst ne  z punk tu  wi dze nia  mak sy -
ma li za cji  war to ści  bo gac twa  dla  wła ści cie li  oraz  w ja kich  sy tu acjach  pod ję cie  pro jek tów
o ujem nej  war to ści  ak tu al nej  net to  jest  ra cjo nal ne.
Zgod nie  z teo rią  dy wi den dy  re zy du al nej  przyj mu je  się,  że  w przy pad ku  bra ku  pro jek -
tów  o do dat niej  war to ści  ak tu al nej  net to,  przed się bior stwo  po win no  wy pła cić  nad wyż kę
środ ków  fi nan so wych  ja ko  dy wi den dę.  Sy tu acja  kom pli ku je  się  jed nak,  gdy  ko niecz ne  jest
za pła ce nie  po dat ku  od  dy wi dend.  Z punk tu  wi dze nia  wła ści cie li  nie  róż ni  się  on  ni czym
od  pro jek tu  o ujem nym  NPV.  W ta kim  wy pad ku  za miast  wy pła ty  dy wi den dy,  moż li we  jest
wy ko rzy sta nie  pro jek tu  o nie wiel kim  ujem nym  NPV  do  mak sy ma li za cji  war to ści  dla  wła -
ści cie li.  Je śli  przed się bior stwo  mo że  zre ali zo wać  przed się wzię cie  o bez względ nej  war to -
ści  NPV  więk szej  niż  war tość  po dat ku  od  dy wi dend,  prze pro wa dze nie  ta kie go  pro jek tu
do pro wa dzi  do  mak sy ma li za cji  war to ści  dla  wła ści cie li.
Ten  sam  pro jekt  in we sty cyj ny  mo że  cha rak te ry zo wać  się  róż ną  war to ścią  ak tu al ną
net to  dla  róż nych  in we sto rów.  Wy ni ka  to  z fak tu,  że  wła ści cie le  dy wer sy fi ku ją cy  ry zy ko  po -
przez  in we sty cję  w róż no rod ne  in stru men ty  fi nan so we  okre śla ją  ina czej  ocze ki wa ną  sto -
pę  zwro tu  niż  in we sto rzy  wraż li wi  na  ry zy ko  cał ko wi te.  Róż ni ce  w po strze ga niu  ry zy ka
mo gę  do pro wa dzić  do  sy tu acji,  w któ rej  ni sko  ry zy kow ne  i ge ne ru ją ce  nie wiel ką  sto pę
zwro tu  pro jek ty  bę dą  od rzu ca ne  przez  in we sto rów  zdy wer sy fi ko wa nych  a za ra zem  ak cep -
to wa nych  przez  wła ści cie li  po szu ku ją cych  moż li wo ści  dy wer sy fi ka cji  pry wat ne go  ma jąt -
ku  po przez  nie ry zy ko wa ne  pro jek ty.  Ta  sa ma  przy czy na  tłu ma czy  od mien ne  po stę po wa nie
w sy tu acji,  gdy  pro jekt  wy so ko ren tow ny  i ry zy kow ny  jest  do brze  oce nia ny  przez  in we sto -
rów  zdy wer sy fi ko wa nych,  ale  od rzu ca ny  przez  in we sto ra  nie zdy wer sy fi ko wa ne go.
Trze cią  opi sa ną,  sy tu acją  jest  ko niecz ność  re ali za cji  pro jek tu  o ujem nym  NPV  w ce -
lu  za pew nie nia  dal sze go  funk cjo no wa nia  przed się bior stwa.  W ta kim  przy pad ku  pro jekt
o ujem nym  NPV  pro wa dzi  naj czę ściej  do  uwol nie nia  no wych  prze pły wów  pie nięż nych,
któ re  po zwo lą  prze ciw dzia łać  chwi lo wym  za bu rze niom  płyn no ści  fir my,  a tym  sa mym  za -
pew nią  jej  dal sze  funk cjo no wa nie  i umoż li wią  re struk tu ry za cję  fi nan so wą.
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